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SALAZAR V. BUONO AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Christopher Lund 
Commentators often complain that Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
is incoherent and unprincipled.  That accusation usually seems over-
wrought—perhaps we should not expect so much consistency from a Court 
that decides only the cases that come before it, holds multiple values, oper-
ates with continually changing personnel, and gives significant but unquan-
tifiable weight to precedent.1  Yet of the areas of Establishment Clause 
litigation, this complaint carries the most force in the context of passive-
display cases—cases where the government passively displays a religious 
symbol, like a cross or a crèche, a Ten Commandments monument, or an il-
luminated Bible.  Here the critics have a point. 
Since 1984, the Supreme Court has had seven separate cases regarding 
the constitutionality of passive displays.  In those seven cases, the Court has 
issued thirty-six separate opinions—more than five opinions per case on 
average.2  Frequently the Court has been unable to get the necessary five 
votes to form a majority opinion.3  And only one of the thirty-six opinions 
has ever garnered more than five votes.4  Each case seems to involve wild 
factual disagreements over why the symbol was put up and what the symbol 
means.  Each case seems to involve deep legal disagreements over what 
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acceptable from the unacceptable, and whether the judiciary should be in-
volved in this business at all. 
This lack of consensus has become so predictable as to be almost com-
ical.  In 2005, the Supreme Court decided together two cases about Ten 
Commandments displays: McCreary County v. ACLU5 and Van Orden v. 
Perry.6  On the day the Supreme Court agreed to hear these two cases, I 
wrote an email to the Law and Religion listserv.  Noting how the cases were 
dissimilar, I predicted that the Court might ―split the difference and confuse 
appellate courts for the next twenty years (i.e., Lynch/Allegheny County).‖7  
It was an inside joke.  In two cases, one from 1984 (Lynch) and one from 
1989 (Allegheny County), the Court had badly fractured on the issue of hol-
iday displays, leaving lower courts little guidance on when they were con-
stitutional.8  My comment was meant as a jest, but the jest came true: The 
Court upheld the Ten Commandments display in Van Orden but struck 
down the display in McCreary County, leaving lower courts in ―purgatory,‖ 
deprived of much real guidance on what to do with Ten Commandments 
displays.9  When it comes to passive displays, it seems that the Supreme 
Court can agree only to disagree. 
Earlier this spring, the Supreme Court decided another passive-display 
case—Salazar v. Buono, known widely as the Mojave Cross case.10  Salazar 
offered interesting facts.  And for the first time, Justice Kennedy would be 
the middle Justice.  Justice Kennedy had sided with the liberals on some Es-
tablishment Clause matters,11 but his expressed views on passive displays 
were solidly conservative.12  People therefore rightly wondered whether Sa-
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But all of that was not to be.  Salazar turned out to be a bust.  The 
Court splintered yet again, with five opinions and no majority opinion.  The 
governing plurality opinion is cryptic and obscure, focusing on one of the 
more minor issues in the case and even leaving that undecided.  Of course, 
we may see Salazar again, especially if the district court ignores the Su-
preme Court’s not-so-subtle signals and continues to take a hard line against 
the cross.  But there is no promise of that, and the resulting appeals will 
take years to reach the Supreme Court in any event.  With all that in mind, 
this piece reviews the issues in Salazar, the road the Court took, and the 
roads not taken, offering reflections on where we have been and where we 
are likely to go. 
I. THE FACTS OF SALAZAR V. BUONO 
Salazar v. Buono is a case full of important factual nuances and com-
plicated legal maneuvers, but it begins simply enough: It begins with a 
cross.  In 1934, on an isolated hill in the Mojave National Preserve known 
as Sunrise Rock, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) put up a cross to 
commemorate the loss of American soldiers in World War I.  The VFW did 
not ask the government for permission to use the land, but the government 
did not object.  And so there the cross stood, in its final iteration standing 
somewhat less than eight feet high, composed of four-inch diameter metal 
pipes, all painted white.13 
For about seventy years, no one objected.  But in 1999, a Buddhist 
asked permission from the National Park Service to put up a stupa in the 
same place as the cross.  The Park Service denied his request, explaining 
that it did not want any new religious symbols and that it was actually try-
ing to take down the existing cross (which never had the right to be there in 
the first place).  Soon Congress got involved, first prohibiting the use of 
federal money to remove the cross, and then designating it a national me-
morial.  But this did not shield the cross: A few months later, a federal dis-
trict court ruled that its display violated the Establishment Clause. 
Then things got interesting.  The government appealed the district 
court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit.  But before the appeal was decided, 
Congress agreed by statute to a land exchange.  Under the terms of the deal, 
the VFW would get the cross with the acre of land surrounding it, while the 
federal government would get a five-acre parcel of private land elsewhere 
in the preserve.  Standing now on private rather than governmental land, the 
cross would move from being a prohibited religious establishment into be-
ing a protected act of free exercise.  The cross could continue to stand, and 
the litigation would end. 
But while Congress passed this land-transfer statute during the appeal 
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s invalidation of the cross and put 
the effect of the land-transfer statute off to a later date.  In due time, the 
ACLU challenged the land-transfer statute back in the district court, arguing 
that it was inconsistent with the district court’s earlier injunction.  The dis-
trict court agreed, as did the Ninth Circuit; the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to hear the case. 
II. SALAZAR V. BUONO AND THE ROADS NOT TAKEN 
As the case developed, two issues stood at the center of Salazar v. Bu-
ono—the constitutionality of the cross and the legitimacy of the land trans-
fer.14  Litigated separately, these issues came together before the Supreme 
Court.  But it helps to break the two apart, because there is more to each 
than meets the eye. 
A. Religious Neutrality and the Meaning of the Cross 
The antecedent question behind everything in Salazar is the constitu-
tionality of the cross itself.  To those on the plaintiff’s side, this question 
virtually answered itself—even the more conservative Justices had long 
maintained that endorsements of particular religions are constitutionally 
off-limits.  ―I have always believed, and all my opinions are consistent with 
the view,‖ Justice Scalia once wrote, ―that the Establishment Clause prohi-
bits the favoring of one religion over others.‖15  Other opinions take the 
same position, including ones that would have upheld government-
sponsored prayers on the condition that they stay nondenominational16 and 
Ten Commandments displays on the theory that they are nondenomination-
al.17  Indeed, in a case decided over twenty years ago, virtually the only 
thing that all nine Justices agreed upon was that the prominent display of a 
large bare cross on important government property would be an unconstitu-
tional promotion of Christianity.18 
But an agreement that the government cannot endorse Christianity 
means nothing without an agreement about what constitutes such an en-
dorsement.  And here is where the consensus always breaks down.  Twenty-
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meanings.19  Five years ago, it approved a Ten Commandments display 
along the same lines.20  These sorts of cases created an opening for the cross 
in Salazar.  The government made a succinct and straightforward argument 
that the cross here was a ―predominantly secular‖ symbol, stressing that the 
VFW had put it up as a war memorial and that Congress had embraced it as 
the same.21 
This argument makes a good deal of sense, but it also plays with fire.22  
Objects can have many meanings, but the cross’s religious meaning is un-
deniably primary.  The cross is the central symbol of the central event of 
Christian theology—Jesus died on the cross and was resurrected for the sal-
vation of mankind.23  Much Christian doctrine is esoteric to people nowa-
days, but everyone knows that.  And everyone also knows a second point—
Jesus’ death on the cross carries with it a promise of salvation, but that 
promise does not necessarily extend to all people.  The cross saves some 
but might damn others.  St. Paul captures both aspects of the cross in his 
summation of its meaning: ―The message of the cross is foolishness to those 
who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God.‖24  
Paul’s letters have tremendous influence in the Christian community.  Many 
Christians see the cross as he does. 
But the challenge to this argument is actually twofold.  One part of it is 
that the cross’s primary meaning is religious.  But another part of it is that 
all the secondary meanings of the cross are really just derivative mean-
ings—they all flow back to and hinge upon the religious meaning of the 
cross.  There is an important contrast here with the Ten Commandments.  
The Ten Commandments have secular meaning that disassociates from the 
religious meaning; one can read, understand, and follow the prohibitions on 
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even believing that God exists.  Even in the Biblical narrative, for example, 
Cain was disciplined for murder long before the events on Mount Sinai. 
But the cross is different.  The cross can have no secular meanings in-
dependent of its religious meaning.  The cross is a pure symbol; it has no 
words, no linguistic meaning.  The Ten Commandments can be taken out of 
context.  But the cross works only by evoking the event that it depicts: Je-
sus’ death and resurrection.  Every use of the cross therefore by necessity 
relates back to its original meaning as a religious symbol.  To the extent that 
the cross works as a war memorial, it is only because of the cross’s reli-
gious power.  And there is a common sense underlying all of this.  Precisely 
because the cross symbolizes the promise of salvation extended to Christian 
believers, Christians find comfort in having crosses in cemeteries. But the 
cross is not an intelligible symbol outside of Christianity’s premises—and 
to the extent that outsiders come to understand those premises, they will 
probably not find comfort in the cross.25 
Many amicus briefs focused on how the government’s adoption of 
Christian symbols can threaten the legitimate interests of non-Christians.  
But it is worth some space to explain the danger on the other side.  Under-
standing the game, both the government and its amici offered secular mean-
ings of the cross, divorcing them as much as possible from the cross’s 
religious meaning.  The Solicitor General, for example, called the cross ―a 
symbol of the sacrifices of fallen soldiers.‖26  But this begged the key ques-
tion: How does a cross serve as a symbol of the sacrifices of fallen soldiers?  
For Christians, the link between Jesus’ death and their own deaths comes 
through atonement theology.  Jesus’ death conquers death, thereby freeing 
people from the powers of death.  But on this account, of course, a key 
point is that Jesus’ sacrifice is unlike other sacrifices—Christian theology 
depends on Jesus’ death being fundamentally different from that of ordinary 
human beings.  The Solicitor General strenuously avoids fleshing all this 
out, but that itself then becomes the problem: Reading the government’s 
brief, one gets the impression that Jesus was a man who happened to die un-
justly, just as a lot of men in World War I happened to die unjustly.  Many 
Christians would flatly reject this as inconsistent with Christian theology.  
Yet if the Solicitor General’s explanation of the cross’s meaning creates 
problems, other variants offer trouble of their own.  One amicus brief called 
the cross ―a symbol of the ultimate sacrifice made for one’s country.‖27  





  Similar arguments are pressed in Muslim Veterans’ Brief, supra note 22, at 911 and Jewish Vet-
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  See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 21, at 28; see also id. at 39 (calling it ―a symbol of the sacrific-
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  Brief of Thomas More Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Salazar, 
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to lay down one’s life for the good of others.‖28  These explanations have 
even deeper implicit theologies; many Christians would forcefully reject the 
idea of Jesus as just a patriot who died for his country or a do-gooder who 
died for his friends. 
The basic problem is that whenever the government puts up religious 
symbols, people will want to know what they mean.  The government can 
try to dodge the question.  It can say, as it did here, that the cross is a sym-
bol which could be ―interpreted by different observers, in a variety of 
ways.‖29  But this does not solve the problem either.  Christians have strong 
feelings about what the cross means.  And when the government puts up the 
cross on the theory that it means something else—or even that it just has a 
lot of meanings, none of which have any priority—the government threat-
ens to commandeer (or, better yet, expropriate) the meaning of the cross.30 
B. Religious Neutrality and the Legitimacy of the Land Transfer 
The first issue in Salazar was the constitutionality of the cross.  The 
second was the legitimacy of the land transfer.  At first glance, the land 
transfer appears as a unique twist layered on top of the usual Establishment 
Clause issues.  But in fact this sort of twist is regularly featured in Estab-
lishment Clause cases.  A common theme in Establishment Clause cases 
over the past thirty years has been what to do when the government dis-
claims responsibility for the religious message by pointing to a private par-
ty. 
Over the past generation, the Court has resolutely spotted and rejected 
false claims of privatization.31  Public schools cannot have devotional Bible 
readings over their PA systems, even if students do the actual reading.32  
They cannot put up displays of the Ten Commandments, even if the dis-
plays are donated by private citizens.33  School officials cannot invite stu-
dent volunteers to pray,34 select clergy people to pray,35 or arrange for a 





  Brief of Amicus Curiae the Am. Legion Dep’t of Cal. in Support of Petitioners at 2, Salazar, 130 
S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472), 2009 WL 1640372 (link). 
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  Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 21, at 39 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 
1125, 1135 (2009)). 
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  For another elaboration on this point, see Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: The Sacred and the Se-
cular, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 31, 38–40 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/20/LRColl2010n20Bartrum.pdf (link). 
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  On the other side, the Court has also resolutely spotted and rejected false claims of publicitiza-
tion.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (rejecting the claim that the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibited a private club from meeting after school hours simply because the meeting 
took place on school property) (link). 
32
  Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (link). 
33
  Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (link). 
34
  Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981) (link), aff’d without op., 455 U.S. 913 (1982). 
35
  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (link). 
36
  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (link). 
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State action is present when the government’s crèche goes up on private 
land,37 or when a private party’s crèche goes up on government land.38  
None of these factual differences make any legal difference.  When the 
government gives preferential treatment to religion—either to the religious 
speaker or to the religious message—there is an Establishment Clause prob-
lem. 
If you accept those cases and their principles, the land transfer crum-
bles quickly under the weight of their logic.  In Salazar, the parties disputed 
whether the land-transfer statute actually required the VFW to keep the 
cross up, which would have made Congress obviously responsible for the 
cross.39  But this debate obscured the real point: Even if the new owner 
could legally take the cross down, the deal was structured in a way which 
made it difficult.  For one thing, the cross had tremendous inertia; it was 
big, bulky, and welded into the rock.  By transferring the property with the 
cross in place, the government created obvious incentives for the recipient 
to leave the cross where it was. 
But the bigger problem was that Congress decided to sell the land to 
the VFW without entertaining other suitors.  There were many ways that the 
government could divest itself of the land that would have been truly neu-
tral in regard to the cross.  It could have held a lottery and sold the property 
to the winner; it could have held an auction and sold the property to the 
highest bidder.  The government called the VFW the ―logical purchaser‖ of 
the land because the VFW had put up the cross in the first place.40  But that 
logic was hardly neutral—it gave the property back to the party who had the 
most invested in keeping the cross up. 
An analogy here may illustrate this point best.  Imagine a public school 
district asks for student volunteers to lead prayers in the classroom.  Two 
students volunteer.  A lawsuit is filed and a court finds the practice uncons-
titutional.  The school says it will fix the problem by no longer asking these 
two students to lead prayers.  Instead these same two students will simply 





  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
38
  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (link). 
39
  There were good arguments on both sides.  Congress had designated the cross itself as the nation-
al memorial and had allocated money for a replica of the cross.  See Department of Defense and Emer-
gency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United 
States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002).  And the memorial’s 
official title was the ―White Cross World War I Memorial.‖  16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006).  That all suggested 
the VFW had to keep the cross up.  But the land transfer statute required only that the VFW maintain the 
property as ―a war memorial.‖  Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, 
§ 8121(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (emphasis added).  The government argued that this latter statute 
had priority—that while the property had to stay as a war memorial, it did not necessarily have to be the 
war memorial (i.e., the cross) that Congress had designated.  See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 21, at 32–
33.  The plaintiff thought it ambiguous as to whether the cross had to stay up.  See Respondent’s Brief at 
42–43, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472), 2009 WL 2365232 (link). 
40
  Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 21, at 46. 
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free to say whatever they want, indicate that they will continue to offer 
prayers.  Simple principles of state action here accord with simple common 
sense: The school board has not fixed the problem.  This is a false privatiza-
tion, just as the land transfer in Salazar was false. 
In both cases, the government has put a thumb on the scale in favor of 
the religious message.  And in the larger context of Salazar, this hardly 
comes as a surprise.  Congress had passed several statutes declaring its alle-
giance to the cross.41  So whether you phrase it in terms of purposes or ef-
fects, the result is the same: The land transfer demonstrated favoritism 
toward the cross.  And this is true not just in Salazar—a number of lower 
court cases involving similar facts have all similarly involved such false 
privatizations.42 
III. THE RESULT IN SALAZAR 
All these interesting issues, however, went unresolved.  As is by now 
well known, a procedural glitch prevented the Court from reaching any of 
them.  The government’s failure to appeal the Ninth Circuit’s initial deci-
sion meant that all of the issues decided therein became res judicata.43  The 
only remaining issue related to the land transfer.  But even there, the scope 
of the Supreme Court’s review was limited.  The district court had struck 
down the land transfer not because it violated the Establishment Clause, but 
because it was inconsistent with the terms of the original injunction.44  So 
the only thing squarely before the Supreme Court was whether the land-
transfer statute could be read consistently with the existing injunction, or 
whether the injunction essentially barred the government from continuing 
on with the land transfer.45 
The Court ultimately refused to authoritatively decide even that limited 
question.  Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion rejects the district court’s 
reason for seeing a conflict between the two, but in the end sends the case 
back to the lower courts for further review.  The opinion opens by noting 
that, because of res judicata, the constitutionality of the cross and the pro-
priety of the initial injunction should now be off the table.46  But the plurali-





  See statutes cited supra note 39; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 
106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-230 (2000) (restricting the use of federal funds to remove the 
cross). 
42
  Two cases involve local governments selling off parts of a public park in order to avoid Estab-
lishment Clause challenges to a religious object in that part of the park.  See Mercier v. Fraternal Order 
of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005) (Ten Commandments display) (link); Freedom from Religion 
Found. v. Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000) (statue of Jesus Christ) (link). 
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  See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815 (2010). 
44
  Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (link). 
45
  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1815–16. 
46
  Id. at 1815. 
105: 60 (2010) The Future of Establishment 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/22/ 69 
subtle suggestions that the cross really was constitutional all along.47  If one 
takes this seriously, Justice Kennedy seems to be suggesting that the land-
transfer statute somehow changes the social meaning of the cross—it was 
initially an unconstitutional religious endorsement, but it became a predo-
minantly secular object when Congress embraced it as a war memorial.  
The original injunction may have been appropriate, but changing facts (i.e., 
Congress’s decision to transfer the land) necessitate reexamination of the 
cross’s constitutionality. 
Justice Kennedy’s logic here is hard to follow; it is profoundly unclear 
how Congress’s action could change the social meaning of the cross and 
even more unclear how Congress’s action would secularize the cross.  But 
perhaps the opinion was not meant to be parsed so finely.  Most likely Jus-
tice Kennedy is just trying to put a thumb on the scales for the district court 
on remand.  The message seems clear: You are free to decide on the land 
transfer any way you like, but uphold it if you can.  Revise the terms of the 
earlier injunction if you need to do so.48 
But although the plurality opinion signals approval of this particular 
cross, it also goes to lengths to suggest that not all crosses or passive dis-
plays will be constitutional.  The left should take heart from the fact that 
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts have now gone on record affirming 
that the Establishment Clause indeed prohibits overly denominational reli-
gious displays.49  The plurality opinion (which both of them joined) adopts 
verbatim Justice Kennedy’s conclusion in Allegheny County, where he said 
that ―the [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent 
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall . . . because such an 
obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government’s 
weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular reli-
gion.‖50 
IV. BEYOND SALAZAR 
For those who wanted a big change in the law—and even for those 
who wanted an exciting case to read—the Court’s decision in Salazar v. 
Buono was a bust.  Salazar officially left the Establishment Clause un-
touched, and it only really confirmed what most already suspected—with 
Justice Kennedy as the middle Justice, the Court will probably be more ac-





  See id. at 1818, 1820. 
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  For a more in-depth look at the plurality opinion, see Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The 
Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2010), 
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  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1816 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that symbols which ―promote a 
Christian message‖ or that ―set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed‖ are unconstitutional). 
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  Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
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tion on the part of Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts 
toward making quick and drastic changes.  They will not require the city of 
Las Cruces to remove the crosses from its town seal.51  But neither will they 
allow a city council to put up a big new cross on city property.52  Refusing 
to draw any categorical line, they will find themselves handling these cases 
based on their own unique facts, one at a time, implicitly relying on a host 
of factors—such as the age of the display and the degree to which it is de-
nominational—that they would likely feel uncomfortable explicitly defend-
ing.  In short, the future of passive displays looks a lot like the past.  The 
Court will continue to muddle through. 
Many feared Salazar would bring sweeping changes.  Some even 
feared it would be the end of the endorsement test.53  This latter possibility 
troubles a lot of people, but I see it slightly differently.  In other doctrinal 
areas, the tests really matter; if you know the tests, you can figure out how 
the cases will be decided.  But with the Establishment Clause, the cases 
have always been more important than the tests, because the tests are too 
manipulable to do much work on their own.  So it matters if the Court jetti-
sons the endorsement test in favor of some other formal test.  But what mat-
ters more is if the Court begins to decide the cases differently.  Salazar 
indicates that it will not, or at least that any changes will be small and gra-
dual.  If the endorsement test is abandoned, it will probably be replaced by 
something that looks a heck of a lot like it.  And should the Court adopt 
some new test, that test will surely struggle with the same problems that the 
endorsement test did—the central problem in the context of passive dis-
plays being that they have both religious and secular meanings.54  The Court 
in the past dealt with this problem sneakily, often by simply ignoring one 
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the only way out entirely is by drawing some well-defined categorical line, 
which the Court seems unwilling to do.  So, at the end of the day, Salazar v. 
Buono leaves us where we started—in a state of mild confusion about the 
last decision, definite uncertainty about the legal rule, and eager anticipation 
of the next case. 
                                                                                                                           
server would clearly see a sectarian endorsement of religion.  Though Justice Kennedy’s opinion criti-
cized the endorsement test, the test he suggested was only modestly different.  See Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (link). 
